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ABSTRACT: Though the liberalization of the economy in 1991 affected India as a whole, the state of Guja-
rat and the city of Ahmedabad have undergone the most dramatic changes in the country. The Sabarmati 
Riverfront Development Project in Ahmedabad, one of the largest urban regeneration projects in India, 
was finalized in this context, and soon became the flagship project of the new ruling party. The article en-
gages with the evolution of the project, reflecting on the apparent absence of a conflict that many observ-
ers would have expected to occur given the scale of the intervention, as well as its social and environmen-
tal consequences. Though some episodes of contention, related to a few controversial issues, are identi-
fied in the article, it highlights the presence of a consolidated system of power and dissent management 
on multiple scales. A strong ideological system combining different narratives (development, global com-
petition, fear and security, purity and cleanliness) underpins the Sabarmati riverfront development in Ah-
medabad. These narratives proved to be appealing to the local middle-class, which identifies with the 
message of the far-right Hindu government: respect for religious traditions, alongside an effort to conform 
to international development standards. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On December 12th, 2017, the ‘first ever sea-plane in India’ carried the Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi from the Sabarmati river in Ahmedabad (Gujarat) to the artificial lake 
contained by the Dharoi Dam, 150 kilometres to the North of the city. From the dam, 
the Prime Minister travelled to the Ambaji temple, a major pilgrimage destination for 
Hindus in Gujarat, to pray and make offerings. The state government was up for re-
election and Modi was showing support to the local section of the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP), the Hindu nationalist political organisation he leads at national level. The 
Prime Minister’s flight on the new sea-plane was filmed by several local and national 
television stations and broadcast as breaking news. People standing on the upper and 
lower promenades of the Sabarmati Riverfront in Ahmedabad yelling their support for 
the Prime Minister were also included in the videos1. By the end of December 2017, 
the BJP was confirmed once again as the victorious party in Gujarat under the guidance 
of Chief Minister Vijay Rupani, albeit with a smaller majority compared with past elec-
tions.  
A few months later, on February 12th 2018, the Government of India informed the 
farmers of Gujarat that there would be water shortages from the Narmada canal2, the 
so-called “lifeline of Gujarat” that should provide the state with the water for agricul-
tural needs from the Sardar Sarovar Dam, also known as the highly contested “Narma-
da dam”. In March, several farmers’ unions and associations gathered in Gandhinagar, 
the administrative capital of Gujarat, to protest against the state government. In June, 
a group of NGOs from Gujarat and the bordering state of Maharashtra launched a 
number of actions against the planned Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail (“bullet 
train”) project. Among them there were numerous farmers from Gujarat asking for fair 
compensation should their land be requisitioned in the grand infrastructure project3.  
On October 31st 2018, Prime Minister Modi unveiled the tallest statue in the world 
exactly five years after he laid its foundation stone as Chief Minister of Gujarat. The so-
 
1
 “PM Narendra Modi takes first-ever seaplane flight; watch amazing video of Quest Zodiac aircraft”, Fi-
nancial Express, 12.12.2017, accessed 4.1.2019, available online at: www.financialexpress.com/india-
news/gujarat-assembly-elections-2017/pm-narendra-modi-takes-first-ever-seaplane-flight-watch-
amazing-video-of-quest-kodiac-aircraft/970334/   
2
 “Gujarat can utilise water from Narmada dam till March only”, DNA, 12.2.2018, accessed 4.1.2019, avail-
able online at: www.dnaindia.com/ahmedabad/report-gujarat-can-utilise-water-from-narmada-dam-till-
march-only-2583724 
3
 “Farmers in Gujarat oppose Modi’s Bullet Train project”, The Hindu, 22.6.2018, accessed 5.1.2019, avail-
able online at: www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/farmers-in-gujarat-oppose-modis-bullet-train-
project/article24234145.ece 
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called Statue of Unity, located in the south-eastern part of Gujarat along the Narmada 
river, represents Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, a Gujarati politician at the forefront of the 
movement for Indian independence and who played a major role in the organization of 
non-violent farmers’ protests against the British Empire during the unification struggle. 
The event was covered not only by the Indian media, but also by most of the interna-
tional media4. One month later, on November 31st 2018, the state police of Gujarat be-
gan to release almost 300 activists, mostly belonging to the indigenous population 
(Adivasis), who had been arrested after protesting against the statue and related tour-
ist activities on their land5. Meanwhile, around 8000 farmers belonging to more than 
200 organizations from different parts of India, including Gujarat, marched towards the 
Parliament in New Delhi in protest against the government in the run up to the elec-
tions of Spring 20196.  
These events serve to introduce the object of the research and to illustrate how it 
exists in relation with a number of issues at different geographical scales currently in 
the spotlight not only in local debates, but also in the international press. This selection 
of events highlights the presence of specific physical spaces in the “model state” of In-
dia that function as stages for the “spectacle” of politics and development (Luxion 
2017) on the one hand, and, on the other, stresses the rise of recent episodes of con-
tention, mostly in the rural areas of Gujarat.  
Stimulated by these recent events and drawing on extensive research conducted be-
tween 2010 and 2015, in this article I reflect on the large-scale development of the 
Sabarmati Riverfront in Ahmedabad and question the apparent lack of conflict over this 
urban transformation - an unexpected absence in comparison with other river- and wa-
terfront developments in Indian cities (Baviskar 2011a; Coelho and Raman 2013; 
 
4
 “India unveils the world’s tallest statue”, BBC, 31.10.2018, accessed 7.1.2019, available online at: 
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-46028342; J. Bouissou, “L’inde inaugure la plus haute statue du 
monde”, Le Monde, 31.10.2018, accessed 7.1.2019, available online at: www.lemonde.fr/asie-
pacifique/article/2018/10/17/l-inde-s-apprete-a-inaugurer-la-plus-haute-statue-du-
monde_5370396_3216.html; A. Mártinez, “India inaugura la estatua más grande del mundo con un men-
saje nacionalista”, El País, 2.11.2018, accessed 7.1.2019, available online at: 
https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/10/31/actualidad/1540983135_349959.html 
5
 A. Johari, “Statue of Unity tourism zone will displace us from lands’: Why Adivasis protested Modi event”, 
1.11.2018, Scroll.in, accessed 7.1.2019, available online at: https://scroll.in/article/900473/drowned-
dreams-why-nearly-300-adivasis-were-detained-before-modi-could-unveil-the-statue-of-unity 
6
 S. Dwivedi, “Mega Farmers’ March to Parliament in Traffic-Stopping Protest: 10 points”, NDTV, 
30.11.2018, accessed 7.1.2019, available online at: www.ndtv.com/india-news/thousands-of-farmers-
walk-to-delhi-mission-parliament-tomorrow-10-facts-1955565 
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Follmann 2015) and in other urban areas around the world (Desfor and Keil 2004; 
Grubbauer and Čamprag 2018; Islar 2013).  
Existing studies of conflicts related to river- and waterfront developments mostly 
draw their theoretical inspiration from the literature around water-related struggles in 
political ecology (Worster 1985; Cronon 1992; Castree and Braun 2001; Swyngedouw 
2004, 2009; Kaika 2006). Considering water as a socio-political product manipulated 
and appropriated in different ways by multiple actors with varying access to power is 
the usual starting point for much of this scholarship.  
In the Indian context, the topic of environmental struggles related to water and de-
velopment has been the focus of a vast body of literature on Indian Environmentalism 
and the “environmentalism of the poor” (Gadgil and Guha 1995; Guha and Martinez-
Alier 1997), deeply influenced by the large-scale movement of the 1960s against the 
construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam (Narmada Dam) between the states of Gujarat, 
Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. While the anti-dam movement known as Narmada 
Bachao Andolan has been widely studied by several scholar-activists (Baviskar 1995; 
D’Souza 2002; Mehta 2010) and researchers interested in understanding the different 
power relations in the controversy (Wood 2007), other environmental conflicts, such as 
those in urban or coastal areas, have long been overlooked (Baviskar, Sinha and Kavita 
2006), thus underestimating the emergence of a “bourgeois environmentalism” often 
at odds with the urban poor (Baviskar 2011b) and, more subtly, the occurrence of a va-
riety of forms of middle-class activism engaged in inclusive environmental struggles 
(Follmann 2016). 
Studies of environmental conflicts and power relations in contemporary Indian cities 
(Rademacher and Sivaramakrishnan 2013), a major contribution to the literature on 
urban political ecology “beyond the West” (Zimmer 2015), often focus on water, but 
mostly in terms of supply and wastewater management (Mehta 2005; Karpouzoglou 
and Zimmer 2012; Graham, Desai and McFarlane 2013). Some research has focused on 
the environmental criticalities of large scale urban river- or waterfront development 
projects and related conflicts, mostly in the cases of New Delhi (Baviskar 2011a; 
Follmann 2015, 2016) and Chennai (Arabindoo 2010; Coelho and Raman 2013).  
Ahmedabad and the Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project have also been stud-
ied in a critical perspective, in analyses of the development-induced displacement of 
the urban poor formerly living in the riverbed slums and the increasing segregation and 
unequal provision of basic services such as drinking water or wastewater facilities in 
the relocation sites of former slum dwellers, especially Muslims (Mahadevia 2007; Ma-
thur 2012; Desai 2012a, 2014, 2018; Sato 2017).  
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While these extensive and empirically sound studies highlight the conflicts related to 
housing and relocation issues among the urban poor as a consequence of the riverfront 
development, several studies of the same period focus on a broader issue in Ahmeda-
bad and Gujarat: the rise of an authoritarian form of governance based on Hindu na-
tionalism and development (Bobbio 2012, 2015; Jaffrelot and Thomas 2012; Rajagopal 
2011; Spodek 2011; Yagnik and Sheth 2005, 2011). Within this framework, some schol-
ars investigate the role of place-marketing and branding in Gujarat and Ahmedabad in 
particular (Da Costa 2015; Desai 2012b; Ibrahim 2007), especially after the Muslim car-
nage perpetrated in the city in 2002 by Hindu radicals soon after Modi’s election as 
Chief Minister of Gujarat (Human Rights Watch 2002; Yagnik and Sheth 2005).  
 
 
2. Research questions 
 
Despite this rich critical literature about the Sabarmati riverfront and Ahmedabad, a 
gap emerges in relation to the urban political ecology literature on other Indian cities 
and, more generally, to the international debate about the social production of urban 
nature and related conflicts among different sections of city societies. Although envi-
ronmental conflicts around the creation of the Sabarmati Riverfront Development Pro-
ject and the permanent alteration of the ecosystem are mentioned in some of the 
studies mentioned, dedicated research on the environmental criticalities of the project 
and the apparent absence of a holistic critique combining social and environmental is-
sues is missing.  
Hence, a study is needed to fill this gap in the existing literature and answer a broad 
research question which applies but is not confined to the case of Ahmedabad:  
RQ1 - Is there a relation between large-scale urban projects in fast developing urban 
areas and authoritarian regimes in the global context of state rescaling?  
The hypothesis behind this question is that episodes of contention (McAdam, Tar-
row and Tilly 2001) around the Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project are expres-
sions of dissent over the logic of the project, rather than against it as a whole. Drawing 
on work by Tilly and Tarrow (2007), I contend that such conflicts can be considered as 
“contained” forms of contention, i.e. tolerated by the existing regime, rather than 
“transgressive” forms. This hypothesis is supported by a consolidated body of literature 
in political studies about urban (Stone 1989) and autocratic regimes (Gerschewski 
2013), combined with contributions from geographers and urban studies scholars deal-
ing with the issues of state rescaling, globalisation and authoritarian governance 
(Brenner 2004; Swyngedouw 2000, 2007).  
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Stone’s (1989) study about Atlanta in the 1980s, a city then affected by a high pace 
of development and a racially fragmented society, is a fundamental reference for this 
hypothesis. Stone identified a highly compact urban regime governing the city and 
highlighted relations with those outside the official governing group, included by the 
regime through the promise of increasing influence in local public life, and thereby re-
ducing the risk of criticism. 
Political studies of the main actions taken by autocratic regimes to ensure their sta-
bility, i.e. the “three pillars of stability” (Gerschewski 2013), are also useful to analyse 
the behaviour of the governing coalition in Ahmedabad and Gujarat. Gerschewski fo-
cuses on the phenomena of regimes; “co-optation” of different sectors of society, of 
the “legitimation” accorded to the governing coalition by large sections of the popula-
tion, and, as a last resort, the “repression” of critical voices. The existence of such phe-
nomena will be investigated for the case of the Sabarmati Riverfront in Ahmedabad.  
A final theoretical contribution that supports the hypothesis comes from geography 
scholarship that argues the rhetoric of globalisation and development is not at odds 
with the emergence of authoritarian forms of governance, but goes hand in hand with 
it, thus making resistance difficult, especially where environmental issues are con-
cerned (Swyngedouw 2000, 2007). On this point, Brenner (2004, 1) argues that “subna-
tional scales, particularly those of major urban regions, represent strategic institutional 
arenas in which far-reaching transformations of state spatiality are unfolding”, support-
ing large scale capital investments (Harvey 2001). 
The initial research question and related hypothesis are operationalized through two 
additional sub-questions referring to the specific case of the Sabarmati Riverfront in 
Ahmedabad:  
RQ2 - Which episodes of contention have taken place around the Sabarmati River-
front Development Project in Ahmedabad?  
RQ3 - Why did the different episodes of contention and the various groups support-
ing them fail to converge into a comprehensive movement against the project as a 
whole?  
Drawing on recent reflections on the field of contentious politics which innovate on 
the basis of consolidated approaches to the topic (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001), I 
propose to bridge the existing streams of literature about the Sabarmati Riverfront 
project and Ahmedabad, considering the context of the (partial) mobilization (Sika 
2017) and the repertoires7 of collective action (Tilly 2005; Sika 2017) proposed by vari-
ous groups against (elements of) the Sabarmati Riverfront development.  
 
7
 In the chapter “New Approaches to Contentious Politics”, Sika recalls Tilly (2005) and defines repertoires 
of contention as “the claims that activists make against the regime” (Sika 2017: 23). 
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The research questions are addressed in the following through an analysis of empiri-
cal material collected between 2010 and 2013 in Ahmedabad, other localities in Guja-
rat, and in New Delhi and Mumbai. The analysis will start with a chronological overview 
of the project and a description of its content and context. This will be followed by an 
analysis based on 35 in-depth interviews conducted with experienced witnesses (prac-
titioners, public officials, journalists, lawyers, academics, activists). Particular attention 
will be devoted to interviews with environmental activists, both in Ahmedabad and 
New Delhi. Secondary data and official documents (Public Interest Litigations, Right to 
Information Acts, planning briefs, reports etc.) are also included in the analysis, while 
other research materials will remain in the background, since they fall outside the 
scope of this article8.  
 
 
3. The Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project and its context 
 
Located in the north-west of India at the border with Pakistan and to the south of 
the Rajasthan, Gujarat is a semi-arid state that overlooks the Arabian Sea. Traditionally 
at the crossroads of major trade routes, the state is today still the focal point of large 
infrastructure developments, in particular in its central-eastern part where Ahmedabad 
is located, known as the “golden corridor”. The central portion of Gujarat, historically 
richer than the arid western areas of Saurashtra and Kutch and the easternmost area 
inhabited by tribal populations (Mehta 2005; Yagnik and Sheth 2005), hosts the largest 
cities, as well as the majority of the state’s new industrial centres, Special Economic 
Zones and Special Investment Regions, under development along what is known as the 
Delhi-Mumbai industrial corridor9.  
 
8
 I carried out a survey of 50 households in some of the areas of Ahmedabad that underwent the most 
dramatic transformations between November 2012 and April 2013 with the help of a Gujarati translator. 
The survey was conducted using questionnaires in one of the few remaining slums on the river at the time 
of the fieldwork, Shahpur, and in two relocation sites for former slum dwellers in southern Ahmedabad: 
Bhata Gam (west) and Vatwa (east). The questionnaire was structured into four parts: 1) data about the 
interviewee (age, caste, religion, community group, family); 2) trajectory of displacement; 3) information 
about personal experiences of the Sabarmati river (memory of floods, uses of the river, religious practices, 
water quality); 4) relevant networks and contacts. Systematically taking notes during explorations of the 
main transformations in the urban and peri-urban areas by foot, rickshaw or motorbike helped me to gain 
a much deeper understanding of the materiality of the transformations and their consequences for every-
day life. 
9
 See also: GIDB - Gujarat Infrastructure Development Board (2009), Review of Blueprint for Infrastructure 
in Gujarat (BIG 2020) – Final Report, accessed 20.12.2018, available online at: www.gibd.org/big-2020-
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The rapid and intense industrial and infrastructure developments that have taken 
place since the end of the 1990s (Spodek 2011) have affected the diverse areas and 
populations of the state in different ways (Hirway and Mahadevia 2004). Ongoing in-
dustrial development is tightly bound to the state-managed infrastructure for the dis-
tribution of water, the Narmada Canal (Mehta 2005) and the related Pipeline Project 
(Luxion 2017) whose primary function is to supply agriculture in the driest parts of the 
state. Irrigation was the core motivation behind the construction of the Sardar Sarovar 
Dam across the Narmada river (hence the Narmada Dam) at the borders of Gujarat, 
Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The dam, and the movement against its construc-
tion (Narmada Bachao Andolan), which began in the 1960s and was repressed in 1994, 
have been the object of extensive in-depth studies by scholar-activists and researchers 
from various fields in the last twenty years (Baviskar 1995; D’Souza 2002; Gadgil and 
Guha 1995; Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997; Mehta 2010; Wood 2007) as already men-
tioned.  
The Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project in Ahmedabad is also connected to 
water and development issues in Gujarat, though this became clear only decades after 
it was first conceived. Initially proposed by the French architect Bernard Kohn as a se-
quence of recreational spaces along the non-perennial Sabarmati river in 1961, the 
project long remained nothing more than that. In 1979 a second proposal for a river-
front development was presented to the public by a local group led by Arch. Hashmuk 
Patel. Technically, a project now seemed more feasible due to the presence of a dam 
150 kilometres north of Ahmedabad (Dharoi Dam) and a barrier to the south of the city 
(Vasna Barrage), created to regulate the flow of water in the river after the 1973 flood. 
But the socio-economic conjuncture was not favourable: by the end of the 1970s, crisis 
had settled into the once successful textile industry in Ahmedabad, affecting the liveli-
hoods of many people of the lower castes, both Hindu10 and Muslim, employed in the 
cotton mills. The role of the union created by Gandhi in Ahmedabad some decades ear-
lier, the Textile Labour Association, had declined, and by the 1980s when many of the 
mill workers lost their jobs it had lost its credibility (Mahadevia 2007). These ex-
workers entered the informal labour market, often leaving their homes and moving to 
slums on the Sabarmati riverbed (Breman 2004), which remained mostly dry through-
out the year with the exception of the monsoon season. 
 
summary;  Vibrant Gujarat (2014) “Megaprojects: Avenues for investment in Gujarat”, Government of Gu-
jarat, accessed 20.12.2018, available online at: www.slideshare.net/vibrant_gujarat/large-project-
opportunities-in-gujarat-profile-41341184  
10
 The Hindu workforce also included a large number of members of the “Scheduled Castes” (SC), consid-
ered the lowest strata of Hindu society (Mahadevia 2007).  
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The project for a riverfront in Ahmedabad came up again a few years after the liber-
alization of the Indian economy in 1991, a response to a request by the International 
Monetary Fund to open its market to foreign investments and deregulate business ac-
tivities so that India could pay off international debts (Spodek 2011). The local context 
had changed profoundly: several small and medium enterprises had popped up on the 
outskirts of the city and other parts of central Gujarat (Yagnik and Sheth 2005), while 
agricultural activities were affected by the increase in water demand and polluting in-
dustries (Ballabh and Singh 1997)11. The socio-political situation had changed too: in 
contrast with the agenda of the socialist party (Congress), which had aimed to support 
an alliance between lower castes and non-leading religious groups12 by reserving places 
for them in educational and political institutions, the right-wing Hindu party in Gujarat 
had since the early 1980s been wooing the lower strata of Hindu society (Scheduled 
Castes/Dalits and Scheduled Tribes/Adivasis), giving them assurances on complete in-
tegration within the Hindu world if they supported the party. 
Following several episodes of inter-religious violence related to the “anti-reservation 
movement”, “the BJP decided to play an exclusively rabid Hindu card in corpora-
tion/municipal elections and succeeded in winning elections in Ahmedabad, Vadodara, 
Surat, Rajkot, Bhavnagar, Jamnagar – the major cities in Gujarat” (Patel 2002, 4833). 
Having won in the most important urban areas, in 1995 the BJP party won the state 
elections. At that time, Narendra Modi was General Secretary of the party.  
It was in this context that in 1997 the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) es-
tablished a dedicated body, also known as a Special Purpose Vehicle, for the imple-
mentation of an updated version of the riverfront project: the Sabarmati River Front 
Development Corporation Limited (SRFDCL). Following a feasibility report written by 
the Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology (CEPT) in 1997, the definitive 
proposal for the development of 9 kilometers (later extended to 10.5) of the Sabarmati 
river in Ahmedabad was designed in 1998 by a local consultant, the Environmental 
Planning Collaborative (EPC), composed of several members of the local HCP13 archi-
tecture firm. Promoted for reasons including the repletion of the city’s groundwater 
aquifers, the elimination of flood hazards, the improvement of living conditions of slum 
 
11
 As one of the members of an environmental NGO recalled during an interview, agitation also increased 
in some areas at the periphery of Ahmedabad, since a canal intended for the irrigation of fields to the 
south east of the city, the Kharikut Canal, had been turned into a sewer for extremely polluting industrial 
waste produced by the new factories in the areas of Vatwa, Naroda and Odhav. The High Court of Gujarat 
was urged to plan a Common Effluent Treatment Plant (CETP). 
12
 Known as KHAM, an alliance between Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis and Muslims (see: Mahadevia 2007). 
13
 Architecture office founded by Hashmuk C. Patel, the architect who proposed the 1976 version of the 
riverfront project. The leadership of the office later passed to his son, Bimal Patel.  
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dwellers through relocation, and the beautification of the river, the project envisaged 
the following actions (EPC 1998):  
- the narrowing of the Sabarmati bed, naturally of variable breadth, to a constant 
width of around 250 meters, thus reclaiming approximately 160 hectares (later 
increased to 200 hectares) of land; 
- the construction of concrete retaining walls to protect the city from floods; 
- the dredging of the riverbed; 
- the creation of interceptor sewers to divert domestic wastewater to water 
treatment plants; 
- the creation of a lower and an upper promenade on both banks of the river;  
- the sale of around 20% of the land to private developers for residen-
tial/commercial/tertiary activities, making the project financially sustainable.  
While the SRFDCL was acting as an allegedly diverse “coalition of stakeholders” 
(Bhatt 2016, 262) comprising members of both the majority and the opposition of the 
AMC as well as experts, the EPC was nominated as a “development manager for the 
initial stages of project planning and implementation of the Sabarmati Riverfront de-
velopment” in 1999 (ibid, 266). Hence, under the guidance of Arch. Bimal Patel, the 
EPC supervised the elaboration of technical studies until 2003 and managed the land 
transfer process from the Irrigation Department of the State of Gujarat, which owned 
the riverbanks, to the AMC in order to allow the subsequent sale of land to private ac-
tors.   
During this process, a major “shock” (Spodek 2011) occurred in Ahmedabad and 
across Gujarat. In February 2002, less than one year after the tragic earthquake in 
Kutch in the westernmost part of the state, tensions between the Hindu and Muslim 
populations exploded across Gujarat after the burning of two train carriages occupied 
mostly by Hindus in Godhra. The violence escalated to a massacre of the Muslim popu-
lation and the widespread destruction of their properties by Hindu extremists. In Ah-
medabad, more than 1000 Muslims were killed and 100.000 were moved to relief 
camps (Mahadevia 2007). Even though the 2002 pogrom was widely documented by 
local authors and external observers, emphasizing the rise of a strong Hindu ideology 
(Hindutva) and questioning the state’s complicity in the massacre (Bobbio 2012; Hu-
man Rights Watch 2002; Patel 2002; Yagnik and Sheth 2005; Desai 2012b), these 
events are not included in texts tracing the history of the Sabarmati Riverfront devel-
opment as a successful case study of urban regeneration (Bhatt 2016).  
A few months after the 2002 carnage, Narendra Modi (BJP) became Chief Minister 
(CM) of Gujarat with an agenda focused on re-establishing social order and promoting 
development (Desai 2012b; Luxion 2017). One of his first public actions was the official 
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announcement of the Sabarmati Riverfront project in 2003, after the land transfer from 
the Irrigation Department to the AMC was completed. In the same year, the Chief Min-
ister inaugurated the “Vibrant Gujarat” Biennial Summit to attract national and inter-
national investments in Gujarat.  
In 2004, after the funds for the Sabarmati Riverfront project had been secured 
through loans from the AMC and the HUDCO (Housing and Urban Development Corpo-
ration) national funding agency14, a pilot project started in one parcel of the future de-
velopment land. In 2005 a syphon was created north of Ahmedabad to connect the re-
cently inaugurated Narmada Canal to the Sabarmati river. In 2007 construction work 
started and in 2010 the EPC organized the first public exhibition at CEPT showing imag-
es of the future riverside, in which traditional (Hindu) elements and modern and clean 
public spaces coexisted (Pessina 2012). The relocation of affected slum dwellers living 
along the riverbanks was scheduled in the same year.  
 In 2011, some stretches of the riverfront opened to the public. Most of the lower 
and upper promenades were accessible by 2014, the year of Narendra Modi’s election 
as Prime Minister of India. After this point, sales of land necessary to repay the loans 
and the construction of various facilities slowed down. In 2017, the historical centre of 
Ahmedabad, located on the eastern side of the river and dating back to the early XV 
century, was added to the list of UNESCO sites. 
 
  
4. Episodes of contention around the Sabarmati Riverfront  
 
 A number of controversies emerged around the project for the Sabarmati River-
front, mostly related to social concerns including the displacement of the urban poor. 
Other episodes of contention around environmental issues also emerged, but to a less-
er extent, along with preoccupations about the changing nature of the public spaces 
and the preservation of the cultural aspects of the river. Following the research ques-
tions set out earlier, this section will investigate the nature of these episodes of con-
tention and discuss the lack of convergence among the different issues into a consoli-
dated movement against the project, like those that have emerged around other river- 
and waterfront projects in India. 
 
14
  According to recent data, the SRFDCL received Rs 417 crores (US$69 million) from HUDCO and Rs 445 
crores (US$74 million) from AMC, while the remaining 240 crores (US$40 million) were sold by the SRFDCL 
in share capital (Bhatt 2016).  
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The issue of the displacement of slum dwellers raised a widespread protest from 
2004 on, and led to the formation of the Sabarmati Nagrik Adhikar Manch (SNAM), an 
NGO representing more than 20.000 of the affected inhabitants and moving to include 
other NGOs dealing with housing rights and issues of religious unity after the 2002 
massacre. As Desai (2012a) recalls, “the leaders articulated a powerful discourse of ad-
hikar (rights) in their meetings as well as in their letters to bureaucrats and politicians 
and in the protest rallies they organised. They invoked awaas adhikar (housing rights) 
as nagrik (citizens)”. In the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) against the State of Gujarat, 
the SRFDCL, the AMC and the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA) pre-
sented to the High Court of Gujarat, the petitioners requested information about dis-
placement, and urged the authorities to provide adequate resettlements for all affect-
ed families - not just a proportion of them as intended in the initial version of the relo-
cation plan. They also underlined the importance of the location of the new housing, 
which should avoid negative effects on the livelihood chances of poor families mostly 
engaged in informal activities in the proximity of the river and/or the city centre15.  
The movement, supported by human rights activists, academics and intellectuals 
(CEPT 2009), was partially successful since the SRFDCL relocation strategy was revised a 
number of times in response to the requests of the SNAM. Nevertheless, several relo-
cation sites were constructed at a considerable distance, and some in contaminated 
areas, demonstrating different treatment for Muslims and Hindus (Desai 2012a, 2018; 
Mathur 2012), who were now to be separated having lived side-by-side for decades 
(Mahadevia 2007).   
Environmental concerns did not provoke the same level of protest, though they 
were present in the minds of some of those fighting for the slum dwellers, among 
some academics and the few environmental NGOs of Ahmedabad. Among the main is-
sues of concern were the effects on the ecology of the river from the transfer of water 
from the Narmada canal, the restriction of the river bed, the increased speed of water 
currents, the extensive use of concrete and the effects on the villages downstream of 
Ahmedabad when water discharged during the monsoons. In fact, the authors of the 
Sabarmati riverfront project themselves stated the necessity to increase the availability 
of water in the river in order to recharge depleting groundwater reserves, but did not 
specifically acknowledge that this water was to come from the Narmada canal (EPC 
1998), opened in 2005 allegedly to connect the highly contested Narmada Dam and the 
driest agricultural lands in Gujarat (Mehta 2005), nor that this would create a perma-
nent stagnant waterbody in the middle of the city. 
 
15
 SNAM, “Special Civil Application n. 6280 of 2005”, Public Interest Litigation presented to the High Court 
of Gujarat, District: Ahmedabad City.  
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As the lawyer of the SNAM, who authored the PIL and had been previously involved 
in the Narmada Bachao Andolan, stated in an interview: “Now they want to beautify 
the Sabarmati, therefore they want to take water from the Narmada. The [Narmada 
Water Dispute] Tribunal16 has allotted a certain amount of water to Gujarat. It was 
mainly meant for agriculture, but can be used in minimal part also for the supply of 
drinking water to towns and cities. But in the map Ahmedabad is not in the picture, be-
cause Ahmedabad gets water from Dharoi Dam. So, this Narmada water was not 
meant for Ahmedabad. The real problem is not central Gujarat, it’s Kutch. So, what I 
want to point out, is that this whole [Sabarmati Riverfront] project is based on the 
Narmada water, which is really something against the award of the Tribunal. Technical-
ly speaking such transfer is not illegal, but neither proper nor justified. People need wa-
ter for agriculture, not for beautification” (3.12.2010). 
Similar observations were expressed during a workshop organized in 2009 by the 
Head of the School of Architecture and Planning of CEPT University in collaboration 
with the architect who designed the first proposed project in the 1960s. Asked about 
the reasons for the delay in the School of Architecture and Planning’s involvement in 
the issues related to the riverfront, the Professor told me: “By that time CEPT was not 
connected with the Sabarmati River Front Development Project. We realized that so 
much had happened and that it was not possible to revise the project for sure. Too 
much had happened. As an institution, we thought we should have tried to understand 
what were the gains and what the losses. Coincidentally, Bernard Kohn came to Ah-
medabad. We talked about interdisciplinary study methods: a dialogue needs to be 
built and each student has to understand that there are many different ways to under-
stand cities. It was not in any way a counter‐proposal” (11.12.2010).  
Interestingly, the most vocal critics of the Sabarmati Riverfront on environmental 
grounds were not resident in Ahmedabad, but active in national level environmental 
NGOs based in New Delhi, such as the South Asian Network for Dams Rivers and People 
(SANDRP), which also counts Gujarati members who left their state after the repression 
of the NBA movement. Critique from these groups described the misuse of the Narma-
da water not only for the riverfront, but also for luxury residential developments along 
the Narmada canal and for industries in central Gujarat. They also demonstrated the 
erosion that would be caused on the riverbanks, the high cost of de-silting the river and 
the increased malaria risk that would result from the wide, stagnant body of water cre-
 
16
 The Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal was created in 1969 and in 1979 decided through its operational 
arm (Narmada Control Authority) on the allocation of water between the different states (Gujarat, Maha-
rashtra, Madhya Pradesh) and allowed uses.  
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ated contained by the Vasna Barrage south of the riverfront17. Moreover, they pointed 
to the risks of devastating floods downstream of Ahmedabad, just south of the river-
front, if the Vasna Barrage were was to be opened to discharge water during the mon-
soons, as had already happened in 2006: highly polluting effluents from several chemi-
cal plants are discharged in the river in this area, and would spread over a wide rural 
territory in this scenario. While these warnings had strong influence in New Delhi, and 
provided support for the opponents of a possible Yamuna riverfront following the 
Sabarmati model, they were not the subject of much debate in Ahmedabad. A well-
known environmental activist in New Delhi commented briefly on this phenomenon: 
“Gujarat has become a very quiet state, in which you cannot protest so loudly” 
(18.1.2013).  
Although Ahmedabad hosts several centers for environmental education and con-
servation, at the time of the research there was only one politically active environmen-
tal NGO. The founder of this small NGO agreed with the opinion of the activist from 
New Delhi: “I fully agree with him. Those who do environmental awareness and similar 
things in Ahmedabad are not people of movement, they are not ready to protest. They 
just want to play in a safe corner, doing environmental awareness, environmental edu-
cation and so on, because they are scared of the government and don’t want to take 
risks with the industries and the developers. Most of them made a profession out of 
the environment, but when there is the moment to fight, they never come up” 
(26.3.2013).  
The aims of this environmental NGO are mainly to advocate for the poorest strata of 
the population, threatened by pollution and development-induced displacement, es-
pecially in rural areas, and to study how far development projects conform with envi-
ronmental regulations. In the specific case of the Sabarmati riverfront, the NGO con-
tested the absence of environmental clearance for the whole project, as is required by 
law. Quoting one of the numerous letters the activists had written to the Government 
of Gujarat, to the National Government and/or the Ministry of Environment and For-
ests, “we would like to raise a number of concerns on the Sabarmati Riverfront Devel-
opment Project […]. What was conceived to be a project to ‘revivify the city centre by 
reconnecting it to the river’ in 1997 has become another non-descript commercial ven-
ture marred with controversy […]. In the words of our Hon’ble Chief Minister Sri. Nar-
endra Modi, SRFDCL ‘required my direct intervention to cut through the bureaucratic 
 
17
 See for example: Pradhan A., “Riverfront Development Project in India: Cosmetic Make Up on Deep 
Wounds”, SANDRP, 17.09.2014, accessed on 7.1.2019, available online at: 
www.google.it/amp/s/sandrp.in/2014/09/17/riverfront-development-in-india-cosmetic-make-up-on-
deep-wounds/amp/  
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web of transfer of 202.79 ha of land’ [...].  However, none of its project documents are 
being brought forth in public domain. The official website has been under construction 
for the last three months and none of the other linked websites e.g. neither Ahmeda-
bad Municipal Corporation nor AUDA carries a copy of the […] Environmental Clear-
ance that ought to have been obtained in the past 14 years!” 18.  
Alongside the difficulties of approaching and obtaining convincing responses from 
public institutions, the environmental activists were also frustrated that they had not 
been able to build a larger movement with those fighting on housing issues: “We sub-
mitted our technical materials to those who were filing the case in the High Court 
about the slums, but they couldn’t get convinced and didn’t put them in their own peti-
tion. So, they fought a separate battle, holistically nobody acted” (26.3.2013). Finally, 
they noted that the situation was very different in the rural areas of Gujarat, where 
most socio-environmental struggles take place due to the rapid pace of development 
of highly polluting industry and infrastructure since the end of the 1990s. Most of these 
struggles are supported by environmental NGOs based outside Ahmedabad (e.g. Vado-
dara), often created after the suppression of the Narmada Bachao Andolan. These 
NGOs share in the concern for an “environmentalism of the poor” and act through 
both legal channels and contentious actions (Prajapati 2010), as in the case of the Adi-
vasis protest against the tourist area around the “Statue of Unity” described in the in-
troduction here, and in which these groups were involved. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks: “contained” contention under an authoritarian gov-
ernance regime 
 
The types and reasons of the controversies in the case of the Sabarmati Riverfront in 
Ahmedabad show that dissent is internal to the logic of the project, i.e. it is “con-
tained” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007) rather than against it as a whole. The lack of conver-
gence among the different controversial issues is explained by the difficulty to extend 
dissent and create a movement stretching across topics, classes, and geographical 
scales. Moreover, the actor networks that needed to mobilize demonstrate some 
weaknesses, especially around environmental struggles.  
 
18
 Paryavaran Mitra, “Need for a fact-finding mission into the socio-environmental concerns and Envi-
ronmental Clearance of the Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project”, Letter to the Minister of Envi-
ronment and Forests, 19.2.2011. 
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The absence of an organised movement against the project as a whole prompts at 
least three context-specific explanations: a) a consolidated system of power and inter-
ests able to manage dissent and potential “transgressive” forms of contention; b) 
strong communication capacity of the state, local authorities and specially appointed 
bodies, including the capacity not to communicate the details of the project; c) the dif-
ficulty experienced by those critical of the development model and its environmental 
implications, mainly related to the suppressed NBA movement, to deal with the urban 
environmental struggles in Gujarat.  
Most of these factors relate to the type and ideology of the governing coalition in 
place at the time of the proposal and start of the project, i.e. a very compact regime, 
sharing common goals and visions for the development of the city, able to gain the 
support of those outside the official governing group through promises of increased 
influence in political and economic life, in line with Stone’s findings in Atlanta (1989). 
Moreover, the governing coalition had strong trans-scalar relations at the local, state 
and national level, promoting a combination of development, global competitiveness 
and traditional values attached to a specific religion.  
According to Luxion (2017, 225), “although the disproportionate benefits to certain 
sectors of society were not necessarily intentionally planned, they nonetheless reflect a 
context which includes more deliberate efforts to optimise government intervention in 
the service of industry and GDP growth, to cultivate popular identification with and 
support for Mr. Modi and the BJP, and to promote a vision of Gujarat that centres 
south/central Gujarati Hindus and Jains above others”. The study of Gujarat and the 
ideological power of its governing coalition (Mehta 2005; Baviskar 2007) could hence 
add to existing scholarship about the power of the “developmental state” discourse 
(Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1995).  
The city of Ahmedabad had a specific role within this logic of development and glob-
al competition, especially after the 2002 violence: “Ahmedabad thus served a particu-
lar utility for promoting Gujarat [...]. As a gateway for pursuing investment and profit 
opportunities in Gujarat, Ahmedabad's re‐imagining became an integral part of 
re‐imagining and promoting Gujarat” (Desai 2012b: 56). In Illich’s (1985) words, water 
served as a powerful element to forget the past and create a new identity. This view of 
the transformation of the city was supported by a growing urban middle class that 
identified with the dream of neoliberal development while simultaneously craving 
safety, cleanliness, local identity and religion (Yagnik and Sheth 2005).  
It comes as no surprise then that critique of the project, mostly related to the dis-
placement of the slum dwellers, did not find support among many members of the 
emerging middle class: individuals who had the tools to criticize the project as a whole, 
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including its environmental implications. Yet there was no interest, leaving the single 
environmental NGO in existence without support. Middle-class intellectuals limited 
their criticism to seminars and open letters to newspapers asking for more trees on top 
of the riverfront, in line with what Baviskar defines as “bourgeois environmentalism” 
(2011b).  Hence, the branding of Ahmedabad promoted by the governing coalition and 
its media can be considered successful, since it convinced both external observers19, 
including numerous Gujarati Non-Resident Indians (NRI) living abroad, but investing in 
the city to an increasing extent20 (Joshy and Seethi 2015), and those in local society 
with the most influence.  
Some scholars of the phenomenon of “city branding” compared across several cities 
have observed a direct relation between brand success and the presence of authoritar-
ian forms of governance: “branding helps to showcase the positive neoliberal elements 
of the city while also keeping the control of the image in the hands of the authoritarian 
regime” (Struxness 2013: 3). From this perspective, Ahmedabad may have more in 
common with Dubai or Singapore than Mumbai or New Delhi. Large-scale urban pro-
jects such as the Sabarmati Riverfront in Ahmedabad, which was supported by the 
governing coalition, promoted by the Chief Minister of Gujarat, and entirely paid for by 
loans from local and national authorities, show the power of an authoritarian regime 
facing no substantial challenges from any “transgressive” form of contention (Tilly and 
Tarrow 2007) of the type that could have resulted from a convergence between social 
and environmental struggles, or between urban and rural episodes of contention. 
Drawing on Gerschewski’s “three pillars of stability” in autocratic regimes (2013), we 
can say that for the case of the Sabarmati riverfront and, more generally, for the case 
of the development of Ahmedabad and Gujarat, the robust authority of the governing 
coalition relied on the co-optation of different sectors of the population, particularly 
the most influential parts, and on the legitimation accorded to the governing coalition 
by a large part of the urban population, especially the middle class. The third pillar (re-
pression) did not occur in the case of the Sabarmati riverfront, as no real challenge was 
posed, but the memory of violence remained vivid in the minds of the Amdavadi and 
Gujarati at large after the 2002 pogrom and the collective “shock” that followed 
(Spodek 2011).  
 
19
 Praise for the project also came from unexpected sources, such as an internationally acclaimed jour-
nal of landscape architecture based in Germany: “following the city’s tradition of visionary projects, the 
Sabarmati Riverfront Development is to be seen as a first‐of‐its‐kind urban renewal project in India” (Fenk 
and Scheffer 2009, 44).  
20
 R. Sinha, “NRIs fuelling luxury housing in Ahmedabad”, housing.com, 29.11.2017, accessed on 7.1.2019, 
available online at: https://housing.com/news/nris-fuelling-luxury-housing-ahmedabad/ 
Pessina G., The “Missing Conflict of the Sabarmati Riverfront”.  
 
709 
 
Recalling the debate on the relationship between authoritarian forms of governance 
and globalisation, “this ideology [of globalisation] becomes a vehicle for suppressing 
the possibilities of resistance and the formulation of alternative trajectories. As any 
good historical geographical analysis would easily point out, resistance and the con-
struction of alternative visions and strategies have always been profoundly geograph-
ical affairs” (Swyngedouw 2000: 67). This interpretation could also lead the western 
reader to reflect on the development of spaces more familiar to his or her experience 
and knowledge, and to question the democratic nature of the governing coalitions that 
promote them.  
The transformation of the spaces of Gujarat (Special Economic Zones, Special In-
vestment Regions, Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project etc.) is strongly bound up 
with the image the state wants to create, as well as with its direct involvement in eas-
ing the development. Hence, it is possible to define such forms of spatial development 
as “new state spaces” (Brenner 2004). Nevertheless, the current attitude of the state 
leads to risks not only in terms of well-known spatial and social inequalities across Gu-
jarat (Hirway and Mahadevia 2004; Luxion 2017; Mehta 2005; Spodek 2011; Yagnik and 
Sheth 2005), but also in terms of growth. As Jaffrelot (2013) notes, “the Gujarat growth 
pattern relies on indebtedness. The state's debt increased from Rs 45,301 crore in 2002 
to Rs. 1,38,978 crore in 2013, not far behind the usual suspects, Uttar Pradesh (Rs 
1,58,400 crore) and West Bengal (Rs 1,92,100). In terms of per capita indebtedness, the 
situation is even more worrying, given the size of the state: each Gujarati carries a debt 
of Rs 23,163 if the population is taken to be 60 million. In 2013-14, the government 
plans to raise fresh loans to the tune of Rs 26,009 crore. Of this amount, Rs 19,877 
crore, that is 76 per cent, will be used to pay the principal and the interests of the exist-
ing debts. Gujarat would fall into the debt trap the day this figure reaches 100 per 
cent”. 
These figures could be more convincing for the expanding middle class compared to 
the environmental concerns, which are sometimes difficult to grasp, though neverthe-
less intimately related to a financially undisciplined (Jaffrelot 2013) yet authoritarian 
form of growth governance. Reflecting again on the reactions of local civil society and 
environmental NGOs to the riverfront project in Ahmedabad, and on other cases such 
as New Delhi, it is necessary to bear in mind, with Nair (2005:1), recalled by Desai and 
Sanyal (2012), the fact that the city has only recently become “a legitimate object of 
attention, investigation and research, and as a site that recasts the meanings of citizen-
ship, democracy and indeed modernity in contemporary India”. India’s capital, with its 
11 million citizens within municipal boundaries and 16 million citizens in the metropoli-
tan area according to the last Census (2011), cannot then be compared with Ahmeda-
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bad, which has grown rapidly, especially between 2001 and 2011, to its current size of 
more than 5 million inhabitants in the city and almost 6.5 in its metropolitan area.  
The scale and severity of the environmental issues in each case are very different, as 
is the history of environmental NGOs devoted to dealing with them, whether from a 
“bourgeois environmentalist” perspective (Baviskar 2011b) or a more varied form of 
environmental activism bringing together some members of the middle class, the ur-
ban poor, and part of the rural population (Follmann 2016). In this perspective, I con-
tend that Ahmedabad, and Gujarati society at large, may in the longer run be able to 
develop an original and effective environmental movement, drawing on the experience 
of the Narmada Bachao Andolan and struggling against specific issues of the “model 
state”, thus crossing geographical scales and bridging the urban with the rural. This 
could only happen if or when influential individuals and groups look critically at the 
current governing coalition and start taking action. Ahmedabad and Gujarat could then 
contribute to a political ecology debate “beyond the West” (Zimmer 2015). 
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